

Why States Fail

Honors Research Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for graduation “with Honors
Research Distinction in Political Science” in the undergraduate colleges of The Ohio
State University

by
Derek Foley

The Ohio State University
June 2012

Project Advisor: Professor Bear Braumoeller, Department of Political Science

Introduction

The 20th century was wrought with major wars, rapid democratization, and great power struggles. With the advent of globalization and greater international cooperation, the problems of the 21st century will be more dynamic, spread across international borders, and require an increased international response^[1]. Terrorism, famine, droughts, global warming, disease, water scarcity, nuclear proliferation, arms proliferation, and poverty all will be issues the international community will face^[2].

Along with these issues, an epidemic of state failure seems to be beginning. “State failure” denotes a complete or partial erosion of state authority, creating a security vacuum where the state once was. Failed states cannot control internal or external security, border security, provide basic services, or interact on an international level with other states. This “black hole” of global politics creates a breeding ground for terrorism, illicit drugs and arms trade, and crime. In an increasingly globalized world, these plagues quickly move across borders, affecting all states in the area. Terrorist organizations use the security vacuum to their advantage, using the areas as recruitment and fund-raising centers, failed states thereby having a global destabilizing effect^[3]. But what exactly is state failure?

State failure *de facto* can only occur to states. While chiefdoms, clans, gangs, and organizations may rise and fall and have many similarities to states, we only concern ourselves with states. A state is defined as an organization that enforces sovereignty through held power. Sovereignty, however, is limited to power held by the state, which is primarily derived from legitimacy. Legitimacy, or acceptance of authority, will play a

major role in my theory of why states fail. A state's roles can be compartmentalized into four major parts: border security, internal security, public services, and international participation. A state is able to control its borders, both in form of immigration/emigration and repelling invaders. It can also provide security and enforce law within its borders through police or military force. It provides services such as utility development, roads, security and safety services, and adjudication. It can also participate, if it chooses, on the international stage by joining organizations like the UN, signing treaties, and engaging in war^[4].

State failure is said to be occurring when a state can no longer fulfill one or more of these roles. A failed state is one that cannot control its borders, maintain internal order, provide internal or external security, provide basic public services, or participate internationally. It is important to note that it is the *ability* to fulfill these roles, not *willingness* to fulfill these roles, that classifies a state as failed or not. A failed state cannot fulfill all of these roles even if it wanted to^[5].

A failed state often cannot control its borders. Immigration and emigration aren't regulated and significant portions of the state aren't controlled. The territorial boundaries of the state become gray and fluid. Areas become a sort of no man's land or unruled *Leviathan*. That is not to say that these areas are entirely unsecured, a *bellum omnium contra omnes* as Thomas Hobbes would say. The lack of a governing body, legitimate or otherwise, drives individuals to their ethnic, religious, or family groups or under the wing of warlords or terrorist organizations. Often times a failed state's governing body is restricted to a capital city or portion of territory while the rest of the state remains under a

different authority (or none at all.)

Failed states cannot maintain internal security both due to lack of authority and resources. What little police force there may be is also often a source of human rights abuses and violence which further reduces the government's legitimacy. The subsequent security vacuum leaves plenty of room for militias, warlords, drug cartels, and religious extremists to gain and solidify power. If these groups are able to provide some form of security or rule of law, their influence likely will grow. In the vacuum people tend to aggregate along ethnic, religious, or some other shared characteristic lines. While this provides some security for some groups, it often leads to racial or religious tension and may cause genocide (e.g. Bosnia, Sudan, Chad)^{[6][7]}.

When a government loses its legitimacy and a state becomes weak, many public services often expected of a government either fall short of expectations or do not exist at all. Public utilities and roads fall into disrepair, safety services vanish, social safety nets disappear, and courts are no longer maintained to settle disputes and prosecute crimes. This lack of services decreases state legitimacy, thus creating a positive feedback loop; weak states lack legitimacy and resources so services and security cannot be provided which further weakens the state and diminishes legitimacy and resources.

States are constantly moving closer to failure or towards stability all depending on a number of factors including public services provided, the existence of factionalized political elites, poverty rates, human rights abuses, rule of law, public trust in government, and state legitimacy. At the core of these is legitimacy.

The Question

Why do states fail? The question has attempted to be answered many times and even has some history in the discussion of the fall of Rome. Rome, one of the greatest empires and societies to ever exist, crumbled and fell to lowly barbarians and Visigoths. Why did Rome fall? Some answers were famine, inflation, low crop yields, and the obvious invaders. The question remains why Rome, the greatest power on Earth at the time, succumbed to any one or a combination of these forces^[8]. The same must be applied to modern states. We might be tempted to attribute a modern state failure to invaders, droughts, economic conditions, or internal conflict but none of these sufficiently explain the root of why states fail.

We must ignore these explanations not only because they are insufficient, but also because they remove an essential element of the cause: the state. By suggesting droughts or invaders or economic conditions as the cause, states and their structure are removed from the equation. If droughts, invaders, or economic factors are the cause of state failure then it wouldn't matter whether the state was a democracy or a dictatorship, a free or unfree state, or a state that promotes equality or a state that fosters nepotism and oppression, they would be effected just the same. If the question of why states fail is to be of any significance at all, it must have an answer that can be applied and adapted to prevent state failure. We care about the question because of the weight the answer might have in efforts to prevent future failures. The state and its structure are of the utmost importance. I take this into account and make sure to integrate the state and its structure into my theory.

Why States Fail

In order to study why states fail, two assumptions must first be made. The first is that state failure is not a naturally occurring phenomena. That is to say, states don't simply deteriorate for no reason other than existing. If this were the case, state failure could just be an inevitability or natural process, free from any human control. States are human creations and are controlled by people so it seems silly to think state failure could be anything other than a human creation due to choices made by people. If state failure were natural the question of why states fail would be irrelevant and any explanation would just be a mistaken attribution of cause to some characteristic of a state or decision of individuals.

The second assumption we must make in order to study state failure is that states are not designed to collapse or fail. That is, it is against their very nature to collapse or fail. States' primary goal is survival and maintaining the power status quo. It is also in the nature of individuals to aggregate and subject themselves to an authority of government per Rousseau's social contract^[9]. Therefore, we must look at the structural causes of state failure, not at events that occur to states. Events that occur to states do not explain why the state succumbed to the event and often do not help explain the mode of collapse. It is for this reason that I exclude states that are conquered by greater powers or societies that are wiped out or collapse due to disease or massive natural disasters (e.g. Olmecs, Mayans, Iraq.)

We must ignore superficial explanations of state failure that look at events rather than the states themselves. Common explanations include famine, environmental

changes, invaders, and economic conditions. Just like when attempting to understand why Rome fell these explanations are insufficient and beg the question “why did Rome fall to famine/environmental changes/invaders/economic conditions?” If it is not in a state's nature to fail then it should be able to withstand the occasional famine or repel disorganized invaders.

After covering these assumptions we are free to ask “why do states fail?” The question is daunting, there is no doubt, and it has been attempted to be answered before. Ethnic conflict (Sadowski 1998), state polity (Vreeland 2008), and political economy of security (Morton and Bilgrin 2007) have all been studied in an attempt to define state failure on a more structural level. Ethnic conflict was found to be a result rather than a cause of state collapse^[10]. Vreeland found that anocracies with legislatures were less prone to civil war than even democracies, with absolute dictatorships being most prone to civil war^[11]. Morton and Bilgrin argued that state failure is the product of colonialism and globalization with an emphasis on how modern imperialistic tendencies of strong states exacerbate the problems and conflicts in weak states^[12]. I take a closer look at how state actions cause state failure.

Succinctly put, states fail due to a loss of legitimacy. Legitimacy can be defined as the peoples' recognition of the government's authority and respect of it. Therefore, legitimacy is the key variable that must be studied in order to describe state failure. But this explanation is still superficial and insufficient as it does not explain how or why states lose legitimacy. I have defined the state as having four distinct roles: border security, internal security, public services, and international participation. Participating in

these roles gains the state legitimacy. What these four roles represent are four conditions necessary for maintaining legitimacy. The four conditions are justice, security, liberty, and equality.

Justice can be defined as maintaining a judicial system where rights can be fairly protected. This legal system adjudicates disputes between parties and prosecutes criminals. If the purpose of a government is the protection of rights^[13] then a state must have some system of protecting those rights. People have, at least to a degree, a universal understanding of what is fair and unfair or right and wrong, at least in a utilitarian or retributive sense. A state must maintain and enforce this fairness with a justice system of some kind.

Security can be defined as protection of citizens from financial or physical harm. This includes both security from the threat of invasion by outside actors and internal security from the threat of crimes committed by fellow citizens. It is in the same vein as justice in that security fulfills the role of the state to protect the rights of its citizens. Without state security, citizens' rights to life, liberty, and property extend only as far as they are able to individually defend them. It is the duty of the state to ensure the protection of these rights and actively take countermeasures to eliminate threats against them. A more subtle aspect of security is restraint on the part of the state. The state often has the ability to neglect the right to life, liberty, and or property from its citizens. Part of security must also include the state respecting these rights and not wrongly infringing upon them.

Liberty can be defined as having the opportunity to do as one wills. A state that

does severely curtail the freedoms of its citizens, be it religious, individual, economic, or otherwise, loses legitimacy. This is because it is an abuse of power per the social contract. A government is supposed to protect rights, not be the one removing them. This places liberty in the same category as security and justice as they are all means of assuring rights and self-determination.

The last condition, equality, is the focus of my thesis. Equality is not meant to mean equality in a social egalitarianism sense but in a political sense of equality before the law. When a state unequally applies justice, security, and liberty and resources they are at the greatest risk of losing legitimacy and, therefore, failure. A state may over-tax or sequestering property from a targeted and select group of people. A state may also choose to neglect providing justice, security, and liberty to these groups, either through active oppression or willful neglect. The neglected group, or out group as I will call them, also is often limited in participating in the government either through restricted voting in a democracy or lack of representation in a non-democracy. It is this key condition, equality, that is the cornerstone to state legitimacy.

The mechanism of collapse is multifaceted, but can be explained quite easily as a sequence of events. First, a state unequally applies justice, security, and liberty and resources and treats the out group unequally. The out group becomes disenfranchised and either seeks to undermine the state's authority or turn to alternative authorities in the form of rebel governments, warlords, or clans. The out group, marginalized, rarely seek to produce as it will likely be taken away by the state or by supporters of the state with little to no chance of seeking restoration of the damages. It is for this reason that the out group

often turns to crime, drugs, and rebel groups as a means of restoring, at least in part, justice, security, and liberty to their lives.

Once the out group aggregates under clans, warlords, crime syndicates, or rebel movements the state is posed with the choice of meeting the demands of the group (per Vreeland 2008) or combating them. Typically states that choose the former do not fail as the demands are typically equality and restoration of justice, security, and liberty. Occasionally the demand may be independence which forces the state to choose between loss of territory and population or continued conflict. When the state chooses to continue to neglect the out group's demands they must combat them, thus further marginalizing the group. The increased demand for military and security spending and repair of public utilities and decreased control and revenue, combined with increasing violence, drugs, and crime, all create a positive feedback loop that causes the state to lose more legitimacy. And so a state fails.

Case studies

In order to demonstrate how equal application of justice, security, and liberty and resources I will use a number of case studies of failed states. The Fund For Peace's Failed States Index was used to determine state failure^[14]. I chose the states based upon a number of criteria. First, I ignored states that recently became failed due to invasion by a greater power or by massive natural disasters. Next, I chose states the best embodied aspects of a failed state: inability to maintain border security, maintain internal security, provide public goods, and participate internationally. The states I used for case studies

are Chad, Sudan, Somalia, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), and Guinea. All ranked in the top ten failed states on the Failed States Index with all but Guinea ranked in the top five at least once in the past ten years. I will provide a synopsis of each states' collapse, provide a brief outlook synopsis, and then explain how equality is crucial to each case study.

Chad

Chad gained its independence from France in 1960. Francois Tombalbaye, the leader of the Chadian Progressive Party (Parti Progressiste Tchadien, PPT) as well as a Christian southerner, became President. Tombalbaye and his political bloc in the south had a clear dominance in the early government of Chad. In 1962 Tombalbaye banned all political parties but his own, the PPT. Gabriel Lisette, the previous leader of Chad and Tombalbaye's deputy prime minister in charge of economic coordination and foreign affairs, was banished by Tombalbaye and stripped of his citizenship. Because of the riots that ensued, Tombalbaye declared a state of emergency, dissolved the National Assembly, and created a special criminals court, imprisoning political opponents and innocent citizens^[15].

Now in complete control of government, Tombalbaye imposed a new tax on Chad citizens in 1964. However, it was reported that government officials imposed taxes at three times the normal rate in the north and in rural central Chad. These areas were dominated by Muslims and largely were uneducated. Because of this, Tombalbaye filled his government with southerners. People in the northern and central regions were often

oppressed and fined for reasons such as wearing turbans or having a beard^[16].

Antigovernment activities began to arise in the late 1960's with frequent riots in the northern and eastern regions. Numerous rebel groups were formed, the most prominent being the National Liberation Front of Chad (Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad, FROLINAT.) In order to combat FROLINAT Tombalbaye had to call on the French for assistance who mandated a number of liberal reforms. Sultanate judges were reinstated, unpopular taxes eliminated, and political prisoners were released. These few years reduced tension and conflict^[17].

In 1971, Tombalbaye ended reforms claiming to have crushed the rebellion. He appointed a new chief of staff, Colonel Félix Malloum. Infighting became more common and Tombalbaye became more unpopular as he began implementing the same policies as before. Due to droughts in the 1970's, Tombalbaye had the military round up “volunteers” from villages to plant cotton. Tombalbaye's political support eroded, members of the N'Djamena's gendarmerie killed Tombalbaye in a coup in April of 1975.

Félix Malloum assumed power under a military government called the Supreme Military Council (Conseil Supérieur Militaire, CSM.) The few years that followed were marked by civil war between the CSM and various rebel groups, including FROLINAT. FROLINAT during this time received military assistance from Libya and other Muslim nations and eventually was nearly as powerful, is not more powerful than the CSM. The CSM and south finally fell in 1979. A civil war between multiple parties followed^[18].

Goukouni Oueddei, a FROLINAT militant supported by Libya, took control in 1982. That same year he was overthrown by Hissène Habré, his Prime Minister. Habré

ruled autocratically, throwing political opponents in jail, often torturing them, and practicing ethnic cleansing, attacking the Sara, Hadjerai, and Chadian Arabs and Zaghawa. In 1990 Idriss Deby, the current president, and his political allies overthrew Oueddei^[19].

Deby's regime was similar to previous ones, marked by oppression of political opponents and corruption. Deby's government has been known to use philanthropic funds meant for disaster relief for its own purposes. Elections are considered rigged and the state police force publicly beats political opposition. In the first decade of 2000, rebel groups continued to fight Deby forces. The Darfur conflict in nearby Sudan spilled over into eastern Chad, causing refugees to flood the region and increased conflict. In February 2008 fighting escalated with rebel forces attacking the capital N'Djamena with the support of Sudan. Currently, fighting has died down but rebel forces and political opposition remain. Chad was ranked 2nd on the Failed States Index 2011^[20].

Initially, hopes were high for Chad. However, Tombalbaye's unequal application of justice and liberty caused the rural north and central regions. This initial inequality marginalized a number of groups, decreased the legitimacy of the government and fostered the creation of rebel groups and alternative authorities. Some progress was made in the late 1960's when Tombalbaye liberalized his policies and concessions were made, but his actions following 1971, as well as the actions by the leaders who followed him, continued the downward spiral. Corruption is especially concerning as government profiteering greatly decreases trust in the government both from citizens and foreigners who give aid. While blatant inequality, outside of political loyalties, has decreased under

Deby, Chad was already in the hole and lacking legitimacy and Deby hasn't satisfied enough of the conditions to rebuild legitimacy.

Sudan

In 1956 Sudan gained its independence from the UK. Ismail al Azhari, the leader of the National Umma Party of Sudan (NUP), a moderate Islamic party based in northern Sudan, became the national leader of the Transitional government based in the capital Khartoum as Prime Minister. NUP then created the People's Democratic Party (PDP). The PDP and defectors of the NUP replaced Azhari with Abd Allah Khalil, also a northerner. The southern Sudanese people were used to quality public goods and disliked the replacement of British administrators with northern Sudanese. In 1958 elections were held and the people elected a PDP majority to both houses. The new parliament, due to corruption and factionalization, was largely ineffective in pacifying the south^[21].

In November 1958 a coup took place, per Khalil's direction, and Ibrahim Abbud assumed power creating Supreme Council of the Armed Forces as the new government of Sudan. Abbud, while having some success in his first year, exacerbated tensions with the south by suppressing religious and cultural differences and attempted to Arabize the region. Abbud also closed parliament which was used as a forum for southern grievances. In 1963, southern leaders restarted the rebellion.

In 1964, growing dissent in the south and public sectors led to weeks of riots and a national strike of all public servants and students. Khalil dissolved the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the leftist United National Front (UNF) party took

power. They reinstated the Transitional Government and held elections in 1965. However, due to violence and conflict in the south and in some rural areas, elections could not be held everywhere. As a result, voter turnout was low and very few candidates won a majority of the votes. The result was yet another north dominated government under the leadership of Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub; “the Umma captured 75 out of 158 parliamentary seats while its NUP ally took 52 of the remainder.” (Metz 22)

In-fighting led to Mahjub being replaced by Sadiq al Mahdi just to have Mahjub be reelected in 1967. In 1968, because of opposition in the parliament, Mahjub disbanded the parliament. This caused two governments to be acting simultaneously. This ended in 1969 when a coup took place and instated Jaafar an Nimeiri, a military officer, as chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), a socialist “people's republic.”^[22]

The people demanded a democratic government and government-public tensions significantly increased under Nimeiri. Numerous conservative groups formed rebel groups to fight Nimeiri, leading to thousands of deaths and many political opposition leaders being exiled. In 1971 the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) was formed to fight Nimeiri and to create some form of governance for southern Sudan which was being neglected by Nimeiri^[23].

In 1974, numerous coup attempts due to incompetence in the Nimeiri regime and factionalization in Sudan led Nimeiri to declare a state of emergency. Nimeiri imprisoned thousands of political dissidents and killed 700 rebels and opposition leaders. The decade following was marked by numerous concessions made by Nimeiri that eased

tensions. However, rampant corruption and incompetence and discontent over Nimeiri's order that sharia be the basis of law in Sudan lead to a number of strikes in 1985. In April 1985 a coup overthrew Nimeiri and instated Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab as the head of state with the Transitional Military Council (TMC) as the governing body of Sudan.

The people welcomed the new government which promised to end the civil war with the south and return power to the citizens within 12 months. However, Dhahab was inept and led Sudan into bankruptcy. Dhahab was also unable to negotiate an end to the civil war due to his unwaivering decision to continue subjugating the south to sharia^[24].

Dhabab was succeeded by Sadiq al Mahdi who fell just as short as Dhahab in fulfilling promises. Sadiq al Mahdi dissolved the government in 1989. Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir, a military officer, forcefully succeeded Mahdi and established the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation. Bashir imposed sharia on the south and sought to end the southern rebel forces and opposition parties. This led to an escalation of the civil war over the next decade.

The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) was formed in 2003 in the south which led to Bashir and Islamist allied forces to ethnically cleanse areas in the south, in Darfur in particular. A peace treaty was signed between the Bashir regime and southern rebel groups in 2005 though armed conflicts still continue to this day between the north based Bashir regime and southern forces^[25]. On July 9th, 2011, South Sudan became a de facto independent country.

Initially Sudan began to fail when conflicts between the northern government and

south arose due to underrepresentation of the south. With the excuse of rebel groups being present in the south, the northern based government was able to cease holding elections there effectively removing the south from the political process. Rebel groups formed and regularly protested the north, at times rioting. The increase in rebel groups and violence gave the north an excuse to crack down on political opposition by declaring a state of emergency. The final straw was Nimeiri's decision to impose sharia law on the largely Christian and indigenous southern Sudanese people. This oppression which was only made worse under Bashir fueled the civil war and collapse of Sudan. Blatant ethnic cleansing by Bashir's regime destroyed any remaining legitimacy the Bashir government had both in the south and in non-Muslim countries. Currently Sudan is 3rd on the Failed States Index^[12].

Somalia

In 1960 British held Somaliland in the North and Italian Somaliland in the south gained their independence. A pan-Somalia government was formed, unifying British and Italian Somaliland into the Somali republic. The Somali people desired a unified Somalia but many barriers existed to integration. The British and Italian governments left two completely different systems for education, taxation, policing, and governance. Despite these differences a Prime Minister, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, and a President, Aden Abdullah Osman Daar, were selected and a National Assembly created. Somalia at the time had three major political parties: the Somali National Congress, Somali National League, and the United Somali Party. All gained some seats in the National Assembly

though the Northern Somali National League had disproportionately few seats^[26].

In October of 1969 however, then President Shermarke was assassinated by his body guard and a military coup d'état ensued in which the military took power under the leadership of Major General Mohamad Siad Barre. Barre outlawed all forms of clanism, nationalized nearly every industry, and made Somali the official language of Somalia. His regime was ruthless and had a record of human rights abuses^[27]. These abuses and his repression of clanism lead to the rise of militias.

In 1991, Barre's regime was overthrown and a three-way civil war ensued. In 2004 a couple dozen warlords and clan chiefs came to an agreement in Kenya to share power. They drafted a charter which called for a Parliament of 275 members, a President, and a Prime Minister, and the government was to be known as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The goal was to have a temporary government regain legitimacy and push out other actors like the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and radical Islamists and separatists^[28].

Currently, the TFG plans on having elections in August 2012 to elect a new 225 member bicameral Parliament with a upper house of 54 Senators and a lower house. The TFG largely is not recognized as legitimate by the Somali people. This is because it fails to provide any public services and cannot maintain security. An Islamist militia group known as Al-Shabaab as well as a few other Islamist organizations continue to hold territory and fight TFG and African Union peacekeeping forces. The groups are able to gain power by gaining legitimacy through providing some framework for adjudication and safety as well as the occasional public good such as building of a school or opening

of a port^[29].

Somalia likely could have been a success but was doomed since Shermarke and Barre. The Southern based representatives controlled the government and disproportionately developed the South and accrued wealth there. Corruption also was present and enabled government officials to help their clans while neglecting many Northern families. It is this unequal application of democratic principles and resources that caused factionalization and conflict. Barre's regime was welcomed at first because of the legitimacy lost under Shermarke. Currently, the TFG lacks legitimacy due to their inability to provide any public services or security and the presence of alternative authorities who are better suited to provide adjudication and security. Corruption and nepotism are also major obstacles for the TFG. Currently Somalia is ranked 1st on the Failed States Index^[12].

Côte d'Ivoire

In October 1960 Côte d'Ivoire became an independent democracy. The Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI). The PDCI, believing party competition would cause country disunity, took a number of steps to ensure their inability to be elected. Félix Houphouët-Boigny was not only the head of the PDCI but became the first President as well. Côte d'Ivoire was not much of a democracy, however, as virtually all power resided in the presidency under Houphouët-Boigny who directed the National Assembly^[30].

Because Houphouët-Boigny was moderate, a number of more conservative

members of his party sought to end his rule through a number of coup attempts. This disunity was made worse by Côte d'Ivoire's economy consisted mainly of exports of cash crops such as cocoa and coffee. This led to the government aggregating its economic and political development to the south in Abidjan. Students, unemployed workers, and unskilled laborers all were discontent with Houphouët-Boigny's rule for various reasons. The PDCI government crack down on protesters, causing more discontent^[31].

Houphouët-Boigny in the 1970's allowed some dissent to be aired, mainly in quasi-public forums with the President, and allowed some concessions. He still remained firmly in control of the country, however. The price of of cocoa and coffee dropped dramatically, severely hurting the Ivorian economy, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. There was growing discontent over the economic and political conditions. In the early 1980s student protests and strikes became more prevalent and Houphouët-Boigny crack downs became more severe, closing schools.

In 1993, Houphouët-Boigny died and Henri Konan Bédié became President. Bédié, like his predecessor, maintained power through restrictions placed on political opponents. Bédié was overthrown in 1999 in a military coup putting General Robert Guéï in power. The military allowed elections in October of 2000 and Laurent Gbagbo beat Guéï. Gbagbo imposed harsh political restrictions on non-citizens, individuals primarily from the rural northern parts of the country. In 2002 a short but harsh civil war ensued. Gbagbo and rebel leaders sign a cease fire agreement, with a new shared government to hold elections in 2005. Gbagbo however, with the support of the UN, extended his rule by postponing elections by a year in 2005 and again in 2006. Gbagbo

was officially overtaken in an open election held in 2010, losing to Alassane Ouattara who forcefully took power from Gbagbo in 2011^[32].

Numerous pro-Gbagbo forces and other rebel groups still control portions of the country and fight the government. Initial disparities between north and south and unequal political and economic development in nearly every administration Côte d'Ivoire had since independence led to the rise of rebel groups, primarily in the north. These groups, marginalized politically and neglected economically, took control of the rural north and instituted their own form of government that provided some justice and security for the people. Ultimately, political turmoil due to the out groups led to the loss of legitimacy and Côte d'Ivoire becoming a failed state. Côte d'Ivoire is currently ranked 10th on the Failed States Index^[12].

Democratic Republic of Congo

In 1960 the Democratic Republic of Congo gained its independence from Belgium and appointed Patrice Lumumba as prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu as president. Southern regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo, most notably Katanga, were underrepresented and desired to secede. Seeking to crush the secessionists, Kasavubu sought help from the Soviet Union. With the support of the U.S. and other western powers, Joseph Mobutu led a coup^[33].

Renaming himself Mobutu Sese Seko and the country the Democratic Republic of Zaire, Seko implemented an authoritarian regime. Seko received funding from the U.S. and funded his military privately. Seko's regime until 1997 was nothing but a

kleptocracy. Seko used his power and international support to seize property for no reason, crush his political opponents and dissidents and reward those loyal to him. Rampant corruption and nepotism caused his regime to lose legitimacy and power, and led to the rise of warlords. These warlords often used illegal exotic wood and the illegal diamond trade for revenue. Tribalism became more common as the people sought authorities to provide them with some level of justice and security. Rebel forces frequently fought Seko's forces and though territory was won and lost, Seko wasn't removed from power^[34].

In 1996 the neighboring Rwandan crisis had overflowed into the Democratic Republic of Congo. Hutu militias allied with Zaire and Tutsi militias joined the rebels. In 1997, the rebel alliance ousted Seko and placed Laurent-Desire Kabila as the head of state. Kabila dissolved the government, effectively turning the Democratic Republic of Congo into a state run by competing warlords^[35].

In 2001, Kabila was assassinated and his son, Joseph Kabila, assumed power. Kabila sought to end the war with the rebels and warlords, and in 2003 elections were held and a Transitional Government created. In 2006, multiparty elections were held and Joseph Kabila was elected President. Opposition forces refused to recognize the election, citing discrepancies in the vote. In 2011, Kabila won a second term as President, through the election was widely regarded as rigged^[36].

The Democratic Republic of Congo is a somewhat unique case. While other failed states have very clear out groups, the Democratic Republic of Congo only had loyalists to Seko and everyone else. The vast majority of the country opposed Seko and

instead pledged their support to rebel groups and warlords or tribes. Seko's rule is an extreme example of how failing to meet the conditions that build legitimacy can cause a state to fail. Application of the conditions was unequal, as only loyalists were protected and given any form of public service, though Seko loyalists constituted a minority of the country. Fighting continues in the Democratic Republic of Congo and warlords still control a majority of the territory. Currently the Democratic Republic of Congo is ranked 4th on the Failed States Index.

Guinea

Guinea achieved independence from France in 1958 and instated Ahmed Sékou Touré, head of the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG), as President. Touré ruled as a dictator, outlawing political parties and oppressing the people with no freedom of expression or recognition of human rights. Touré implemented a number of socialist policies that caused him to lose legitimacy.

Touré nationalized all land and many businesses and farms but did so disproportionately favoring his ethnic group Malinke. Though Touré supported a cultural revolution that promoted cross-ethnic nationalism, Touré filled his regime with almost solely his ethnic group, Malinke^[37]. By keeping other ethnicities from the political process and through oppression, Touré created a significant population of marginalized people who formed rebel groups.

Touré ruled until his death in 1984 when the Military Committee of National Recovery (CMRN) seized power. Lansana Conte was appointed as President. The

CMRN and Conte ended Touré's socialist policies and began to recognize human rights. In 1993 elections were held and Conte was elected as President. There were significant discrepancies in the election and it was considered to be a fraud^[38].

In the late 1990s and early 2000s revolts of military personnel and rebel groups became more frequent in response to the 1998 election which was rigged by Conte, causing Conte to crack down on dissidents^[39]. A rebel group known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) began attacking pro-Conte villages and cities. Conte died in 2008, and Moussa Dadis Camara, a military captain, led a coup and seized power. Camara cracked down on dissidents and had to fend off assassination attempts, being driven out in 2009.

In 2009 a Transitional Government was put in place and in 2010 the country's first open elections took place. The people elected Alpha Condé as President. Rebel groups and political opposition still are prevalent. Elections are set to take place in July of 2012 though political opponents of Condé will likely boycott the election due to the expectation of government tampering with the results.

Guinea is a good example of how unequal application of the conditions justice, security, and liberty and resources cause the state to lose legitimacy and fail. Touré's blatant favoritism of his ethnic group, disproportionate nationalization of non-Malinke ethnic groups' farms and businesses, and oppression of certain people groups created numerous marginalized groups which became the out group. Rebel groups gained support and the state lost control over much of the country. Currently Guinea is ranked 11th on the Failed States Index^[12].

Conclusion

Simplified, my theory of why states fail is as follows:

In order to study state collapse, we must assume:

1. State collapse is not "natural". That is to say, states don't just happen to fall apart over time for no reason other than existing.
2. States are designed not to collapse. For this I ignore states that are conquered by greater powers or societies that are wiped out due to disease or massive natural disasters because they, for the most part, are not related to the structure or actions of the states.

From this, we find:

3. A state holds power due to legitimacy. This legitimacy can be recognized by the plurality of people or a narrower, more elite group who have more material or military power.
4. Legitimacy is gained and maintained through ensuring the conditions of justice, security, liberty, and equality. The most important of these is equality. A state must equally apply justice, security, and liberty relatively equally to avoid creating a marginalized out group that will cause conflict, reducing legitimacy.
5. Collapse occurs when a state loses its legitimacy.

As the case studies showed, this is the generalized mode of state failure. Future studies on equality in failing states and the mechanisms by which rebel groups form and influence the state can improve these findings. State failure has destabilizing effects on neighboring countries and the international community as a whole, so it is imperative that we continue to look for new ways to address failed states and seek ways to remedy them.

References

1. Rotberg, Robert I. *The New Nature of Nation-State Failure*. The Washington Quarterly. Summer 2002.
2. Williams, Paul D. *State Failure in Africa: Causes, Consequences, and Responses*. Africa South of the Sahara 2010. 39th Edition (Taylor & Francis: Europa World Yearbook, 2009), pp.21-28.
3. Lambach, Daniel. *Close Encounters In the Third Dimension: The Regional Effects of State Failure*. in “State Failure Revisited I: Globalization of Security and Neighborhood Effects” 2007. INEF Report 87/2007.”
4. Rotberg, Robert I. *Nation-State Failure: A Recurring Phenomenon?* 2003. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/nic2020/panel2_nov6.pdf
5. Ibid.
6. Rotberg, Robert I. *Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators* in Rotberg, ed., *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*. 2003.
7. Sadowski, Yahya. *Ethnic Conflict: Think Again*. Foreign Policy, No. 111 (Summer, 1998), pp. 12-23
8. Tainter, Joseph A. *The Collapse of Complex Societies*. (New Studies in Archeology) Cambridge University Press; 1st Paperback Edition, 1990 edition.
9. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *The Social Contract*, Book III. 1762
10. Sadowski, Yahya. *Ethnic Conflict: Think Again*. Foreign Policy, No. 111 (Summer, 1998), pp. 12-23
11. Vreeland, James. *The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy*. 2008. Journal of Conflict Resolution 52 (3):401-425:
12. Bilgrin, Pinar and Morton, Adam. *Rethinking State Failure: The Political Economy of Security*. in “State Failure Revisited I: Globalization of Security and Neighborhood Effects” Lambach, Daniel and Debiel, Tobias (eds.) 2007. INEF Report 87/2007.
13. Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan Part II: Commonwealth* 1651
14. “The Failed States Index” Fund for Peace. 2005 through 2011.

<http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=program-fsi>

15. Collier, John L., ed. (1990), "Historical Setting", Chad : A Country Study, Library of Congress Country Studies (2nd ed.), Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. "Chad Profile" BBC. May 1st, 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13164690>
20. "The Failed States Index 2011" The Fund for Peace. <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2011>
21. "Early History", Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Sudan A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. "World Report 2011: Chad". Human Rights Watch. <http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2011/chad>
26. Helen Chapin Metz, ed. "Somalia: A Country Study." Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1992.
27. Ibid.
28. "Somalia Civil War" GlobalSecurity. 2012. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia.htm>
29. "Somalia: Garowe conference comes to a close" February 19, 2012. http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Garowe_conference_comes_to_a_close.shtml
30. Handloff, Robert Earl (ed.) (1991), "Ivory Coast: A Country Study," Library of Congress Country Studies, Washington: U.S. GPO

31. Ibid.
32. “Ivory Coast Profile” BBC. December 21, 2011.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13287585>
33. “Democratic Republic of Congo profile” BBC. 2012.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13286306>
34. Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. “The Failing State in the Democratic Republic of Congo” Global Dialogue Volume 13 Number 1. Winter/Spring 2011—Failed States
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Jalloh, Mohamed Pathe. “Guinea: A Historical Profile” Guinee News.
<http://www.guineenews.org>
38. “Guinea” CIA World Factbook. 2012.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gv.html>
39. “Civil War Fears in Guinea” BBC. October 23, 2000.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/986375.stm>